2022
Proceedings

Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law

Smart Home Forensics: Identifying Ddos Attack Patterns on Iot
Devices
Samuel Ho
Purdue University

Hope Greeson
Purdue University

Umit Karabiyik
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security
Studies Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, Information Security Commons,
National Security Law Commons, OS and Networks Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, and
the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Ho, Samuel; Greeson, Hope; and Karabiyik, Umit, "Smart Home Forensics: Identifying Ddos Attack
Patterns on Iot Devices" (2022). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 6.
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2022/presentations/6

This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

SMART HOME FORENSICS: IDENTIFYING DDOS
ATTACK PATTERNS ON IOT DEVICES
Samuel Ho1 , Hope Greeson2 , Umit Karabiyik3
Purdue University
Computer and Information Technology
West Lafayette, IN 47907, United States
1 ho176@purdue.edu, 2 hgreeso@purdue.edu, 3 umit@purdue.edu

ABSTRACT
Smart homes are becoming more common as more people integrate IoT devices into their home
environment. As such, these devices have access to personal data on their homeowners’ networks.
One of the advantages of IoT devices is that they are compact. However, this limits the incorporation
of security measures in their hardware. Misconfigured IoT devices are commonly the target of
malicious attacks. Additionally, distributed denial-of-service attacks are becoming more common due
to applications and software that provides users with easy-to-use user interfaces. Since one vulnerable
device is all an attacker needs to launch an attack on a network, in regards to IoT devices, there is a
need for businesses and homeowners to find out methods of predicting incoming DDoS attacks. The
earlier a DDoS attack is discovered, the earlier mitigation and prevention techniques can be applied.
One way to predict incoming DDoS attacks is from emerging patterns. To discover these patterns,
we constructed a home IoT environment and conducted LOIC and Slow Loris DDoS attacks against
this environment. This setup led to the discovery of five distinct patterns that emerged when the
IoT devices were being DDoS-ed. In this paper, we will discuss the DDoS attack used, home IoT
environment, normal vs attacked traffic patterns, and make recommendations for future research.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Distributed Denial-of-Service, Pattern Analysis, LOIC, Slow Loris,
Digital Forensics

1.

INTRODUCTION

ing over the network brings challenges in terms
of malicious attacks on the devices (Abomhara
& Køien, 2015). Specifically, Distributed Denialof-Service (DDoS) attacks are becoming more
common on IoT devices and more challenging
to combat. This can cause concerns on the security aspect of these devices as DDoS attacks
are usually a precursor to ransom. Hence, early
detection of suspicious activity in IoT devices is
salient. In order to achieve this, collecting evidence of network patterns, examining these patterns, and interpreting both the origin as well as
the aftermath of a DDoS attack through forensic
analysis is necessary for limiting future attacks.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of DDoS
attacks on multiple household IoT devices in

The Internet of Things (IoT) is influencing our
daily routines from the way we react to the
way we behave. Some examples of IoT devices
are air conditioners that you can control with
your smartphone, smart cars that can determine
the shortest route, and smart watches that can
measure and record statistics of every workout
session. These devices communicate with each
other over the network environment that they
are connected to. In this era of globalization,
many homeowners have adopted these IoT devices into their households, evolving their homes
into “smart homes”.
The increasing amount of IoT devices connect1

traffic. The experiment employed infected zombie machines, also known as bots. The study
focuses primarily on two methods for analyzing
arrival rates using the correlation coefficient as
data. This is an excellent way for distinguishing packets between DDoS attack origins and legitimate users, including proxies (Thapngam et
al., 2014). The study proposes two approaches
for measuring packet arrival data from a single questionable source utilizing correlation, with
the outcome of a dependent or independent connection (Cheng et al., 2002). In the dependent
connection of the data, the predictable aspects
appeared to be strong (Thapngam et al., 2014).
Data that is unpredictable is trended to have an
independent correlation (Barry et al., 2001). The
researcher could push the proper actions to the
right packets because the degree of pattern behavior could be measured. However, the attackers’ packets must be blocked, but the user packets must get through the server (Thapngam et
al., 2014).
IoT gadgets are becoming increasingly popular
as more people integrate them into their homes.
The focus of Bhardwaj et al. (2019) was on the
security flaws found in IoT devices. As a result, there is a knowledge gap in the literature
about the privacy and security of these devices,
as well as the most effective ways to study them.
Hutchinson et al. (2020) wanted to apply IoT
forensics, so they created their own IoT forensics lab at Purdue University in order to do so.
Similar to the study done in our paper, the researcher connected 11 devices that were included
in the smart home lab. Linking each device with
the Google Nest Hub Max via the Google Home
app enabled the devices to operate with each
other interactively, such as controlling the smart
light bulb from the Google Nest Hub Max itself
(Hutchinson et al., 2020). Through IoT forensics, they discovered user data such as username,
full name, email, make and model of mobile device, and OAuth credentials. Although some of
the information found such as zip code, names
of the devices, etc may not be useful, it can
be used as reconnaissance to gain further access
into the home network which can lead to spearphishing or blackmail. They also proposed four

terms of network traffic patterns. To investigate this, it is imperative that the tests are conducted in a private network environment in order to run applications of questionable security.
More specifically, the analysis includes evaluating the metrics of the DDoS attack and any distinctive recognizable patterns. Other methods of
analysis include using a packet capture analyzer
to scan the network for any type of malicious
activity to generate accurate reports for further
investigation of the attack.
Previous research focused on using three forensic aspects: Cloud forensics, network forensics,
and device-level forensics to digitally investigate
IoT forensics (Kebande & Ray, 2016). However,
the application of these methods is primarily for
the industrial IoT sector. The majority of smart
homes simply do not have the forensic preparedness and resources to conduct such analysis. Additionally, Sedaghat (2020) focused on network
forensics to detect DDoS on mobile networks by
sending large amounts of traffic to figure out patterns of DDoS attacks. However, the methods
used are for mobile networks rather than smart
home IoT devices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: Section 2 provides the review of the literature in regards to DDoS attacks and IoT devices. Section 3 discusses the methodolgy which
includes all variables, definitions, and validity
threats related to the present study. It also discusses the applications used to run the DDoS attack, the networking aspect of the present study,
as well as how the collected data will be interpreted. Section 4 highlights the results and findings of this study. Finally, Section 5 summarizes
the entire study and the contributions acquired
from the analysis.

2.

RELATED WORK

It is imperative to understand the differences between legitimate and non-legitimate packets in
order to further analyze DDoS attacks and their
patterns. Research was conducted by Thapngam
et al. (2014) to investigate DDoS attack patterns
from regular traffic by overloading the server,
which was linked to numerous PCs with high
2

3.

possible smart home threat scenarios proposed
by Bhardwaj et al. (2019). The most interesting of which would be the Alexa botnet environment issue. This is when Alexa-enabled devices
can be used to create a botnet environment that
can cause network traffic problems through all
connected devices that could result in their malfunctioning. What was interesting is that it was
mentioned in the paper that this is similar to a
DDoS attack in terms of how critical the threat
is (Hutchinson et al., 2020).
One of the most popular network analyzer
tools is Wireshark, which was used in this paper to conduct forensic analysis on the DDoS
attack. A study was done by (Ndatinya et al.,
2015) to analyze the behavior of packets in the
network using Wireshark. Packet analysis is extremely significant for two reasons. For starters,
packet analysis is part of the starting points of
everything vital to a network since it helps us to
know the condition of the network in advance
of problems occurring. Second, packet analysis is important for diagnosing a network in the
event of an attack, and it allows network managers to check into cables and determine the
traffic crossing them or any abnormalities that
may exist (Ndatinya et al., 2015)(Varghese &
Muniyal, 2021). The research analyzed various packets related to different types of attacks
and how to determine those attacks with Wireshark, one of which focused on identifying BitTorrent DDoS attacks. Although regular traffic
was identifiable once the attacks were injected,
it was also evident which attacks were from BitTorrent. A DNS query to resolve the IP address for www.bittorent.com was found in several packets (Ndatinya et al., 2015). The client
establishes a TCP connection with the BitTorrent server by sending a SYN signal during a
three-way handshake. In succeeding packets, the
same client connects to additional servers, such
as www.surveymonkey.com and c5.zedo.com, to
retrieve data. Because of the anomalous TCP
packets, this BitTorrent data transfer is most
certainly creating network congestion (Ndatinya
et al., 2015). In our study, we followed a similar
methodology on packet analysis as discussed in
(Ndatinya et al., 2015).

METHODOLOGY

The present study’s goal was to engage the depth
of DDoS attacks on different household IoT devices through forensic analysis. To achieve this
goal, we have launched our own DDoS attacks on
a smart home environment. The following sections describe the proposed measures, design, lab
environment, and data analysis for our study.

3.1

Research Measures

This study employed the single-group posttestonly design as the independent variable is manipulated with a single group and the group is
measured. The independent variable is the type
of cyberattack. The dependent variable is the
presence of traffic patterns following a DDoS attack. This was operationalized as the result of
the network traffic analysis on the household IoT
devices. Thus, this study attempts to answer the
question of “What are the network traffic patterns following a DDoS attack on household IoT
devices?” In terms of validity, a possible threat
to internal validity is that the entire study was
done in a controlled lab environment, eliminating
any outside influences and challenges that may
occur in the real world.

3.2

Research Design

The primary goal of a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack is to try to defeat a web server or host
by giving it as much bandwidth as you can such
that it breaks. Since they have a limited amount
of bandwidth that they are allowed to use, the
web servers or hosts will crash/go down if there
are too many requests to that specific web page.
A DDoS attack is an amplification of a DoS attack, using multiple computers to attempt the
same type of attack. Bigger companies such as
Google and Microsoft will be hard to bring down.
However, smaller websites with less protection
and bandwidth can suffer massive impacts on
the amount of money they are making. In this
case, we are not attacking a website, but rather
a router that is responsible for providing layer
2 and layer 3 connectivity in terms of the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) was used to
conduct the DDoS attack (Low Orbit Ion Can3

is set up in the private network is essential for
this research. Upon inspection of the router,
we discovered that the TP-Link Archer C1900
only has 4 ethernet ports, meaning we would
have to deploy both wired and wireless infrastructure. We used the wireless access point of the
TP-Link router, but did not connect a WAN uplink to the public domain as one would normally
do. Instead, we set up the WAN interface on
the TP-Link router and assigned the LAN gateway IP address to the WAN interface. The wireless infrastructure uses an RFC 1918 (Rekhter et
al., 1996) compliant IP address scheme for our
private network. All devices used were placed
into a 172.16.1.0/24 network segment. DHCP
assignment was used to assign IP addresses to
the router and all the IoT devices (See Table 2).

non. [Software] , 2020). LOIC was initially developed to be a network stress testing application
by Praetox Technologies. After LOIC’s public
release, it is now one of the most maliciously used
tools due to its user-friendly design and accessibility. The application is written in C#. The
way LOIC works is that LOIC sends out continuous TCP, UDP, or HTTP packets to a target URL or IP, intending to disrupt service for a
particular host. To broaden the attack surface,
different number of treads (also known as bots)
were used. Thus, LOIC was either ran with 100
treads, or 10,000 treads.
A Slow Loris attack is a type of DDoS attack that opens connections to a website. As
connections end and a new connection frees up
from someone else using the website, Slow Loris
will repeatedly open up another connection until all the available connections are opened. The
open source Python script that was used to run
the Slow Loris attacks can be obtained from
Github (Yaltirakli, 2015). The main purpose of
the script was to open and maintain connections
to the router such that when LOIC breaks the
connections between the router and the IoT devices, Slow Loris takes up that connection, eventually denying any available connections from
the IoT devices to the router. Since the script
could only be run once per terminal, multiple
terminals needed to be running simultaneously
for Slow Loris to be effective. We ran the attack
5 times, each with an increasing number of terminals running the Slow Loris attack - 20, 40,
60, 80, and 100.
The devices that were available to us are a
result of Hutchinson et al. (Hutchinson et al.,
2020) who implemented a smart home laboratory. For the purposes of this paper, we will
only be performing the DDoS attacks on 5 devices (see Table 1).
In terms of legality, it is legal to attack your
own servers for stress-testing. However, it is considered a felony to perform a DDoS attack on a
public or non-personal network according to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, n.d.). Due to the
possible legal issues that come with conducting
a DDoS attack, ensuring that the architecture

3.3

Test Environment

The test environment was set up to mimic a real
IoT household. The first step was to set up
an internal network segment as discussed earlier. After pressing the WPA/Reset button at
the back of the TP-Link Archer C1900 to factory reset it, we used the default TP-Link web
GUI to configure the wide area network (WAN)
and local area network (LAN) on a Dell Inspiron
15 3000 laptop. The Google Nest Hub Max was
set up to connect to the LAN, which assigned
it a DHCP IP address. A Samsung A50 smartphone was used as the central connection device.
After hard resetting the Samsung A50, a Google
account was created to allow downloads from the
Google Play Store. The Google Home application was installed from the Google Play Store to
allow connection to the Google Nest Hub Max.
Next, three mobile applications - Wyze, Gosund,
and August were installed to test the functionality of each individual device. After ensuring
the Wyze camera, Gosund smart plug, and August smart lock were fully functioning independently, all three devices were linked on through
the Google Nest Hub Max. Fig. 1 shows a visual representation of the logical network architecture.
4

Table 1: List of the IoT devices used in this study
Device
TP-Link Archer C1900
Google Nest Hub Max
August Smart Lock Pro
Wyze Camera
Gosund Smart Plug

Description
Central router for LAN networking
Smart hub to perform voice activated activities
WiFi enabled home security device
Security camera
Automation device

Table 2: IP addressing of the IoT devices used
in this study
Device
TP-Link Archer C1900
Samsung A5 Smartphone
Google Nest Hub Max
August Smart Lock Pro
Wyze Camera
Gosund Smart Plug
Dell Laptop

3.4

IP Address
172.16.1.10
172.16.1.141
172.16.1.221
172.16.1.133
172.16.1.151
172.16.1.206
172.16.1.249

Research Analysis

Wireshark, an open-source packet analyzer, was
used to capture the network traffic to be further
analyzed. Wireshark was chosen for this experiment as it is the world’s most popular network
monitoring tool. It is used by many commercial
and non-profit organizations, government agencies, and educational institutions because it provides a microscopic view of what’s going on on
their networks (Sharpe & Warnicke, 2011). Following the capture of DDoS packets, the data
acquired during the attack was further analyzed
to discover what sorts of packets are gathered,
the patterns of this data, and the details of the
attack.
Wireshark was used during the DDoS attack
to begin collecting packets in live view, culminating a large set of packets from the attack. Both
LOIC and Slow Loris were used as the attack application which was collected by Wireshark. The
attacks were divided into segments for data collection, with each segment lasting 300 seconds.
Time was recorded in seconds to ensure accuracy. We set a baseline by capturing an initial
traffic sample with no attacks running. After the
300-second time frame was reached, the Wire-

Figure 1: Logical Network Diagram
shark packet capture was terminated and stored
for further analysis after each section of attacks.
The captured packets were filtered in a number
of ways to identify any distinguishing patterns
between regular traffic and DDoS attack activity. The “I/O Graphs” tab was used to provide
a visual representation of network traffic. This
was the first step of comparing the patterns of an
attacked graph versus the normal traffic. This
phase of analysis was simply looking at the patterns of traffic flow over the network by filtering
out all the IoT device’s IP addresses as well as
TCP error packets. This was to filter out all
external traffic that was not a part of the IoT
devices as well as TCP errors to ensure the most
accurate data was analyzed.
The next phases of the analysis consisted of
diving deeper into the attack surface by looking at the specific numbers and percentages to
accurately compare normal traffic from attacked
5

siderable decline in packets per second and the
time frame reveals more frequent and narrower
intervals between time frames, the system may
be facing DDoS attacks on the network.
Although an I/O graph can give an overall visualization of the packets over the network and
thus can give a generalized idea of the patterns
and flows, it is just as important to break down
the detailed numbers. The averages of packets
per second, average bytes per second, and average packet size were analyzed by looking at
the file properties under statistics. The average
packets per second for the normal traffic was 13.9
packets, whereas the attacked traffic contained
an average of 5.6 packets per second. This finding revealed the attacked traffic contained on average, half of the number of packets per second
compared to normal traffic. Similarly, the findings for average bytes per second displayed similar information, where the normal traffic contained 3120 bytes per second and the average attacked traffic contained 1129 bytes per second.
This indicated that attacked traffic contained
three times fewer bytes per second than of normal traffic. Lastly, average packet size was calculated. Findings suggested there was no significant difference in packet size from normal packets versus attacked packets. The average packet
size for normal traffic contained 225 packets and
the average packets for attacked traffic had 196
packets.

network traffic. This consisted of comparing the
averages of packets per second, average bytes per
second, and average packet size by looking at the
file properties under statistics. The TCP error
flags were compared by using the filter command
“tcp.analysis.flag” and the average percentage
was calculated and displayed in the form of a
graph. The unexpected packet loss was also compared in the same manner as TCP error flags using the command “tcp.analysis.lost segment or
tcp.analysis.retransmission”. Lastly, the packet
length was investigated to see how much difference the size of the packet was transferred
over the network as well as how fast those packets were bursting. This was analyzed using the
packet length tab under statistics.

4.
4.1

RESULTS
I/O Graph

The initial findings were done using Wireshark’s
I/O graph, and the patterns were filtered to display all of the IoT device’s IP addresses as well
as TCP Error flags. Fig. 2 shows the color coded
filters, where it displays the red bar for TCP errors and the remaining lines are the IoT devices.
The total number of packets in the normal traffic
was 4207, whereas the average number of packets in the attacked traffic was 1774. The total
amount of attacked traffic was only half of what
the total amount of regular traffic was. Thus,
we can conclude that a Slow Loris DDoS attack
may slow down traffic by 50% on average.
Four I/O graphs were compared in order to
visualize the findings. Fig. 3 shows the I/O
graph for the baseline, Fig. 4 shows the Slow
Loris attack using 60 terminals, Fig. 5 shows the
Slow Loris attack using 100 terminals, and Fig.
6 shows the combination of LOIC and Slow Loris
attack. As can be observed from the graphs,
normal traffic has few red bars and larger intervals between time frames, but attacked networks have significantly more red bars and narrower gaps between packets. Furthermore, the
attacked network shows fewer packets per second, but normal traffic shows two to three times
more packets per second. According to the findings of the I/O graph, when traffic shows a con-

Figure 2: I/O Graph: Color Coded Filters

4.2

TCP Error Flags

When the TCP Error flags were compared between regular traffic and attacked network traffic, the findings revealed a significant pattern between the two types of traffic flow. According to
the data, the attacked network traffic had twice
6

Figure 3: I/O Graph: Normal Traffic

Figure 4: I/O Graph: Slow Loris 60 Terminals
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Figure 5: I/O Graph: Slow Loris 100 Terminals

Figure 6: I/O Graph: LOIC and Slow Loris
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However, the burst rate was discovered to have a
distinctive pattern between normal and attacked
traffic. The normal packet burst rate had 0.66
seconds per packet and the attacked traffic burst
rate was 0.28 seconds per packet on average. The
findings suggested the burst rate of packets was
two times faster with an attacked traffic than
normal traffic.

as many TCP packet defects as regular traffic.
The normal traffic showed very little amount of
TCP Error flags (9.8%), whereas Slow Loris and
LOIC attacks contained on average 23.1% TCP
Error flags. Specifically for Slow Loris, the attack using 20 terminals contained 28.3% TCP
Error flags, 40 terminals 29.5%, 60 terminals
23.9%, 80 terminals 20.9% and 100 terminals
22.7%. For LOIC, 100 bots contained 18.8%
TCP Error flags, 10,000 bots contained 20.6%,
and a combination of LOIC and Slow Loris contained 22.1%. The number of overall packets
versus TCP Error packets for each segment of
attacks can be seen in a bar graph format in Fig.
7.

4.3

5. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The integration of IoT smart devices in home
environments has grown exponentially due to
the efficiency and functionality of these devices.
However, introducing Internet connected devices
into your home network environment means introducing vulnerabilities and risks of being attacked. Given the possibility of being attacked,
homeowners should be able to tell or predict
when they are being attacked. Our study focused on DDoS attacks, specifically TCP attacks using LOIC and Slow Loris. When these
attacks are being ran, certain patterns can be
seen clearly through packet analysis tools such
as Wireshark. To summarize, there were 5 obvious patterns that emerged when the DDoS attacks were running. First, attacked traffic contains a lesser number of packets captured per
second compared to normal traffic. Second, normal traffic has a low percentage of packet loss,
whereas attacked traffic has a high percentage
of packet loss. These two patterns coincide with
the nature of a Slow Loris attack. As Slow Loris
runs, it opens connections and takes up bandwidth. Thus, there will be less network traffic
as the bandwidth has been occupied or used up.
Third, attacked traffic has a unusually high number of TCP error packets compared to regular
traffic. This pattern aligns with a TCP DDoS
attack which was conducted using LOIC. Fourth,
normal traffic packets contain more bytes per
second, whereas attacked traffic contains lesser
bytes per second. Fifth, the burst rate of packets of attacked traffic is two times faster than the
burst rate of packets of normal traffic. With the
discovery of these patterns, business and homeowners can know when their network has been

Unexplained Packet loss

When dealing with traffic flow via the internet,
packet loss is to be expected; nevertheless, too
many packet losses might signal a network attack. The findings revealed that when a DDoS
attack happens on the system, there is a considerable percent of increased packet loss compared
to regular traffic when examining unexplained
packet loss over the network. The outcomes
of this investigation revealed that the attacked
network experienced four times the amount of
packet loss as a network with normal packet flow.
The normal traffic contained a packet loss of
1.9% whereas the attacked network contained on
average 8.1% packet loss. Specifically for Slow
Loris, the attack using 20 terminals contained
9.9% packet loss, 40 terminals 10.3%, 60 terminals 8.5%, 80 terminals 8.0%, and 100 terminals
8.1%. For LOIC, the attack using 100 bots contained 6.4% TCP packet loss, 10,000 bots contained 6.7%, and a combination of LOIC and
Slow Loris contained 6.9% packet loss. A visualized graph can be found in Fig. 8.

4.4

Packet Lengths

The length and the burst rate of packets were
analyzed to determine any distinctive patterns
between normal and attacked traffic. The findings suggested the length of the packets indicated
no drastic difference. The normal packet lengths
of 20-39 (bytes) contained 47.61%, whereas the
average of the attacked traffic contained 46.15%.
9

Figure 7: TCP Error Flags

Figure 8: TCP Packet Loss
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DDoS-ed.
There are a few recommendations that can be
made for future research. Due to limited resources, all attacks were only run once. Ideally, multiple trials should be run to reduce the
likelihood of outliers occurring. Besides that,
each packet capture and attack was run for 300
seconds. Given more time and disk space, the
packet captures and attacks should be run for
a longer period of time to ensure more detailed
data is collected. Different software and metrics could be used to conduct attacks against the
IoT devices. The scope of our study was limited to certain DDoS attacks. However, future
research can explore the network patterns that
may emerge when their IoT devices are under
attack. Lastly, more focus can be put on the
unexplained packet loss in Section 4 for extending this work and conducting real-world testing.
Exploring classifiers trained to detect unnatural network activity will be key to justifying the
packet loss.
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